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THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE DOCTRINE
AS A DEFAULT RULE
Gregory E. Maggs*
I. INTRODUCTION
The “holder in due course” doctrine, as implemented by Article 3 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C., or the Code),1 governs negotiable
instruments such as checks and promissory notes.2 The doctrine says that
a party who acquires a negotiable instrument in good faith, for value, and
without notice of certain facts, and who also meets some additional
requirements,3 takes the instrument free of competing claims of ownership4
and most defenses to payment.5 The doctrine thus may relieve a party
acquiring a check or note from worries that anyone else owns the instrument or that its maker will have particular legal grounds for refusing to pay
it.
For example, suppose that a person borrows money from a bank to buy
a house and makes a note promising to repay the loan.6 The bank might
later sell the note to an investor. If the note meets the formal requisites of
a negotiable instrument, and the investor purchases the instrument in good
faith and for value and without notice of various potential problems, the
investor may qualify as a “holder in due course.”7 The investor then will
have assurance that no one else can claim an interest in the note, even if the
bank has purported to sell the note to someone else. In addition, the
investor will know that the homeowner has a duty to pay the note, *784
*

Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. The
author thanks Professors Robert Brauneis, Bradford R. Clark, Peter B. M aggs, and
Jonathan S iegel for their help ful suggestions.
1
U.C .C. art. 3 (1995).
2
See id. § 3-1 04(a) (de fining negotiable instrument, in part, as “an unconditional
prom ise or order to pay a fixed amount of money” that is payable to bearer or
identified perso n).
3
Id. § 3-302 (defining “holder in due course”). The spec ific requirements for
becoming a holder in due course are more fully discussed infra Part II.B.
4
Id. § 3-3 06.
5
Id. § 3-3 05(b) (making certain defenses inap plicab le to ho lder in due course).
6
See id. § 3-10 3(a)(5) (d efining “maker” of note as “person who signs or is
identified in a note as a pe rson undertaking to pay” the note).
7
Id. § 3-3 02.
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even if the homeowner might have had a defense to payment against the
bank such as fraud or failure of consideration.
The holder in due course doctrine has remained largely unchanged for
hundreds of years.8 Lord Mansfield clarified the holder in due course
doctrine in several important common-law cases decided during the late
1700s.9 His rules were later codified in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.), a model act drafted in 1896 and eventually adopted by
forty-eight states.10 Since the 1950s, every state has replaced the N.I.L.
with Article 3 of the U.C.C.11 Most states now have supplanted the original
version of Article 3 with a revised version promulgated in 1990.12 Both
versions of Article 3 have retained the basic features of the doctrine as it
existed at common law.13 As Professor Grant Gilmore said, “[T]ime seems
to have been suspended, nothing has changed, the late twentieth century
law of negotiable instruments is still a law for clipper ships and their exotic
cargoes from the Indies.”14

8

See WILLIAM E. BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND
NOTES 2-14 (1943) (describing development of negotiability and holder in due
c ou rse do ctrin e); 2 FRED E RIC K M . HART & WILLIAM F. WILLIER, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§
1.01-.08, at 1-1 to-29 (1997) (same); Edward L. Rubin, Learning from Lord
Mansfield: Tow ard a Tran sferab ility Law for Mo dern Comm ercial Practice, 31
IDA HO L. RE V. 775, 7 77-8 6 (1995 ) (same).
9
See, e.g., Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758) (holding that good
faith purchaser of bank note acquired good title to note); Peacock v. Rhodes, 99
Eng. Rep . 402 (K.B . 178 1) (ex tending hold ing of Miller to bills of exchange).
10
4 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & LARY LAWREN CE, UNIFORM
COMM ERCIAL CODE SERIES § 3-101: 01, at 4 (1994); JAMES J. WHITE &
ROBERT S. SUMME RS, UNIFORM CO MM ERCIAL CODE § 1, at 3 (3d ed.
198 8).
11
See 4 HAWKLAN D & LAW RE NC E, supra note 1 0, § 3 -101 : 01, at 3
(stating that Article 3 is revision and m ode rnization of N .I.L.).
12
See [State U.C.C. Variations Binder] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC ), at xix-xx
(1997) (listing 47 jurisdictions that now have adopted revised version of Article 3).
13
See Rub in, supra note 8, at 77 7 (co mmenting tha t negotiable instruments law
has retained ma ny princ iples for 200 years); M .B.W . Sinclair, Codification of
Neg otiab le Instruments Law: A Tale of Reiterated Anachronism, 21 U. TOL. L.
REV. 625, 625 (1990) (noting that law of negotiable instruments has changed very
little despite “revo lutionary deve lopm ents”).
14
Grant Gilm ore, Forma lism and the Law of Neg otiab le Instrum ents, 13
CREIG HT ON L. RE V. 441, 4 48 (197 9).
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Over the course of this long history, a set of conventional policy
arguments for the holder in due course doctrine has developed. The
standard justification for immunizing a holder in due course *785 from
claims and defenses is that the immunity will encourage beneficial
commercial transactions.15 For instance, in the example above, the doctrine
arguably encourages the investor to buy the note from the bank, and thus
makes the bank more willing to lend money to the homeowner. The
standard explanation for the various requirements for attaining holder in
due course status--good faith, value, lacking notice of certain facts--is that
these requirements promote fairness and properly limit the incentives that
the doctrine creates.16
This Article questions the conventional policy arguments. It contends
that parties can generally recreate the effects of the holder in due course
doctrine by using “waiver of defense” clauses in ordinary contracts.
Pursuant to these clauses, parties may specify the precise circumstances
under which an assignee of contractual rights takes those rights free from
claims and defenses. As a result, this Article argues, a justification for the
holder in due course doctrine must do more than show that stripping claims
and defenses encourages beneficial transactions; it must explain why
maintaining the doctrine as a matter of law is preferable to leaving the rules
regarding the transfer of instruments to private contract.
This Article suggests an alternative economic justification for the
doctrine that takes into account the possibility of using waiver of defense
clauses as an alternative to making negotiable instruments. It asserts that,
while parties could replicate the doctrine through waiver of defense
clauses, the holder in due course doctrine spares them the effort. In this
way, the doctrine serves as a default rule that may reduce transaction costs,
and thus may promote efficiency. This Article further asserts that the
requirements for attaining holder in due course status should exist because
they probably establish limitations that people who use negotiable
instruments want, and that they would include in waiver of defense clauses
if they could not make negotiable instruments.
*786 II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HOLDER IN DUE
COURSE DOCTRINE
The current official version of Article 3 of the U.C.C. codifies the
holder in due course doctrine in sections 3-302, 3-305, and 3-306, all of

15
16

Discussed infra Part III.A.
Discussed infra Part IV.A .

4

THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE DOCTRINE AS A DEFAULT RULE

which are reprinted in the Appendix to this Article.17 Sections 3-305 and
3-306 declare that a holder in due course takes a negotiable instrument free
from certain claims and defenses. Section 3-302 states the requirements for
obtaining holder in due course status. The following discussion explains
these provisions.
A. IMMUNITY FROM CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
Ordinary contract law specifies that, unless otherwise agreed, the
assignee of rights under a contract takes the rights subject to any defenses
available against the assignor.18 For example, suppose that a business
contracts to pay a furniture dealer $1000 for a desk and chair. The furniture
dealer may assign its right to receive the $1000 payment to a third party,
such as a bank. As an ordinary assignee, the bank would take the right to
receive payment subject to any defenses that the business could assert
against the furniture dealer. Thus, if the dealer failed to deliver the desk and
chair and that failure would excuse the business from paying the dealer, it
also would excuse the dealer from paying the bank as an assignee.19
By contrast, the assignee of a negotiable instrument who has the status
of a holder in due course generally takes the instrument free of the maker’s
defenses. Section 3-305(b) states, with one exception, that “[t]he right of
a holder in due course to enforce the *787 obligation of a party to pay the
instrument ... is not subject to defenses of the obligor ... or claims in
recoupment.”20 The sole exception provides that the maker of an instru-

17

Infra app., pp. 822-8 24.
See RESTA TEM ENT (SECON D) OF CO NTR ACTS § 336(1) (1981), which
asserts:
18

By an assignment the assignee acquires a right against the obligor only
to the extent that the obligor is under a duty to the assignor; and if the right
of the assignor would be voidable by the obligor o r unenforcea ble against
him if no assignment had been mad e, the right of the assignee is subject to
the infirmity.
For a similar expression of the rule, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACT S § 11.8, at 810 (2d ed. 1990); 2
19
See RESTATEM E N T (SECOND ) OF CONTR ACTS § 336 illus. 6 (1979)
(pro viding similar example ); see also U.C.C. § 2-210 (2) (1995) (authorizing
assignm ents of rights under sales contra cts).
20
U.C .C. § 3 -305 (b) (1 995 ).
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ment may assert socalled real defenses, such as infancy, duress, incapacity,
illegality, fraud in the factum, or a discharge in bankruptcy. 21
For instance, suppose that the business in the example above issues a
negotiable promissory note for $1000 to the furniture dealer and that dealer
sells the note to a bank. If the bank qualifies as a holder in due course, then
it could enforce the note against the business, and the business could not
assert the dealer’s failure to deliver the furniture as a defense to payment.
The bank would take the note free of that defense, and the firm’s only
means of asserting its claim for nondelivery of the furniture would be to sue
the furniture dealer for breach of contract.22
In addition to taking an instrument free of defenses and claims in
recoupment, the holder of a negotiable instrument also takes the instrument
free of competing claims of ownership. Section 3-306 says that “[a] person
taking an instrument, other than a person having rights of a holder in due
course, is subject to a claim of a property or possessory right in the
instrument....”23 By contrast, a “person having rights of a holder in due
course takes free of the claim to the instrument.”24 To understand this rule,
suppose in the example above that, after the business issues the note to the
furniture dealer but before the dealer sells it to the bank, a thief steals it and
sells it to a finance company. Under section 3-306, if the finance company
qualifies as a holder in due course--if it purchases the note in good faith,
without notice of the theft, and so forth--the finance company will then own
the note. The dealer cannot recover it.
*788 The rules stated above have changed very little over time. The
prerevision version of Article 3, first promulgated in the 1950s, contained

21

Id. § 3-3 05(a)(1) (listing real defenses); id. § 3-305(b) (subjecting holder in
due course to defenses stated in section 3-305(a)(1), but not other defenses). For an
in-dep th discussion of real defenses and possible justifications for treating them
differently, see Clayton P. G illette, Rules, Stand ards, and Precautions in Payment
System s, 82 V A. L. R EV . 181 , 237 -243 (1996).
22
See U.C .C. § 2-711 (stating remedies available to buyer of goods when seller
fails to deliver); id. § 3-305 cmt. 3 (exp laining ho w maker of note would retain
contractual rights against payee in this situation).
23
Id. § 3-3 06.
24
Id.
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highly similar provisions.25 Before it, the N.I.L. and the common law
established largely the same rules.26
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR HOLDER IN DUE COURSE STATUS
To become a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument, a party
must first qualify as a “holder” of the instrument. This means that the
person must have possession of the instrument, and the instrument must be
payable to that person or payable to bearer.27 A party who satisfies the
formal requirements of being a holder must then meet eight additional
requirements, specified in section 3-302, to qualify as a “holder in due
course.”28 Seven of these eight requirements relate to the manner in which
the person obtained the instrument. The other requirement concerns the
appearance of the instrument. The following discussion briefly describes
each of these eight requirements.
First, the holder must give “value” for the instrument.29 Typically, a
holder will give value by buying the instrument or taking the instrument as
payment for a debt.30 For example, a bank might purchase a mortgage note
from another bank, or a *789 merchant might take a cashier’s check in
payment for a sale of goods. A holder does not give value by merely
25

Section 3-305 of the prerevision version of Article 3 stated: “To the extent
that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrume nt free from (1) all
claims to it on the part of any person; and (2) all defenses of any party to the
instrument with who m the holder has no t dealt ex cept ... [real defenses, such as
infancy, d uress, etc.].” U.C.C. § 3-305 (198 9).
26
The N.I.L. stated : “A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any
defect of title of prior parties, and free from defenses available to prior parties
among themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount
thereof against all parties liable thereon.” N.I.L. § 57 (1896 ), reprinted in UNIF.
NEGO TIABLE INSTRUME NT S ACT § 57, 5 U.L.A. 13-14 (1943). Decisions
under the N.I.L. recognized implied exceptions for real de fenses, such as infancy.
See gen erally U.C .C. § 3 -305 cmt. 4. (prerevision) (discussing defense of infancy).
For a brief d escription of this c omm on-law history, see Rub in, supra note 8, at
778 -86.
27
U.C .C. § 1 -201 (20) (1995) (“ ‘Ho lder,’ with respect to a ne gotiab le
instrument, means the person in possession if the instrument is payable to bearer or,
in the case of an instrume nt payable to an identified person, if the identified person
is in possession.”).
28
Id. § 3-302 (19 95) . A holder in due cou rse ma y transfer his or her rights to
another party. Id. § 3-20 3(b). As a result, a party can have the rights of a holder in
due course without actually being a hold er in due cou rse. Id. § 3-2 03 cmt. 2.
29
Id. § 3-3 02(a)(2)(i) (imp osing value requirement).
30
Id. § 3-3 03(a)(1)-(5) (stating ways that hold er may give value).
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promising to pay for an instrument; a promise constitutes value only “to the
extent the promise has been performed.”31
Second, the holder must take the instrument “in good faith.”32 The Code
defines good faith as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing.”33 A holder who participates in a
fraudulent scheme might lack good faith under this standard. For example,
a check-cashing service might act in bad faith if it takes an indorsed check
from a person whom it suspects stole the instrument.
Third, the holder must take the instrument “without notice that the
instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or that there is an uncured
default with respect to payment of another instrument issued as part of the
same series.”34 Instruments payable at a definite time become overdue after
the time for payment has passed.35 Demand instruments become overdue
after ninety days in the case of checks,36 or after an “unreasonably long”
period in the case of other instruments.37
Fourth, the holder must take the instrument “without notice that the
instrument contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered.”38
Consequently, the holder cannot know or have reason to know that
someone has forged the signature of a drawer, maker, or indorser or has
altered the terms of the instrument. A person might alter the terms of an
instrument by erasing the original terms and substituting new ones.39
Fifth, the person must take the instrument “without notice of any claim
to the instrument described in [s]ection 3-306.”40 A claim under section
3-306, as noted above,41 is a claim of ownership. *790 For example,
suppose that the payee loses a bearer instrument and that someone else
finds it. The payee has a claim of ownership to the instrument just like the
payee would have a claim of ownership to any other lost personal property.

31

Id. § 3-3 03(a)(1).
Id. § 3-3 02(a)(2)(ii).
33
Id. § 3-1 03(a)(4).
34
Id. § 3-3 02(a)(2)(iii).
35
Id. § 3-3 04(b)(2 ).
36
Id. § 3-3 04(a)(2).
37
Id. § 3-3 04(a)(3).
38
Id. § 3-3 02(a)(2)(iv).
39
See id. § 3-4 07(a) (de fining altera tion).
40
Id. § 3-3 02(a)(2)(v).
41
Supra Part II.A.
32
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This provision would thus prevent the finder from becoming a holder in due
course.
Sixth, the person must take the instrument “without notice that any party
has a defense or claim in recoupment described in [s]ection 3-305(a).”42
Section 3-305(a), in turn, lists all the different kinds of defenses a drawer
or maker might have on a check or note, including real and personal
contract defenses and other defenses established by Article 3.43 For
example, the maker of a note might argue that he never received the
promised consideration for that note.44
Seventh, the holder cannot have taken the instrument in certain specified
ways outside the ordinary course of business. The holder, for instance,
cannot have taken the instrument “by legal process or by purchase in an
execution, bankruptcy, or creditor’s sale or similar proceeding.”45 The
holder also cannot have taken the instrument “by purchase as part of a bulk
transaction not in [the] ordinary course of business of the transferor.” 46
Similarly, the holder cannot have taken the instrument “as the successor in
interest to an estate or other organization.”47
Eighth, the negotiable instrument must have a proper appearance. When
the holder takes the instrument, it must not “bear such apparent evidence
of forgery or alteration” or otherwise appear “so irregular or incomplete as
to call into question its authenticity.”48 An instrument might appear
incomplete if it lacks *791 words or numbers that an ordinary instrument

42

U.C .C. § 3 -302 (a)(2)(vi).
See id. § 3-3 05(a)(1)-(3) (setting forth possible de fenses, including infancy,
duress, lack of legal capa city, illegality of transaction under other laws, fraud in the
inducement, simple contract de fenses, and claims in rec oup ment).
44
Claims in recoupment are claims arising from the transaction that gave rise to
the instrume nt, such as a claim for bre ach o f warran ty. See id. § 3-305 cm t. 3
(offering breach of warranty as ex amp le of claim in reco upm ent). Fo r exam ple, if
a merchant sells defective goods in exchange for a check, the drawer of the check
may have a claim of recoupment based on an express or implied warranty about the
quality of the go ods. See id. § 2-714 (1995) (providing buyer with remedy for
non-conforming goods).
45
Id. § 3-3 02(c).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. § 3-3 02(a)(1).
43
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would include.49 The Code does not define “irregular,” but the term
presumably describes instruments that do not follow ordinary
conventions.50
Like the rules specifying that a holder takes an instrument free of claims
and defenses, the definition of a holder in due course has changed very
little over time. Section 3-302 in the revised version of Article 3 differs
little from its counterpart in the prerevision version of Article 3.51 It also
closely resembles the comparable provision in the N.I.L.52
III. THE POLICY ARGUMENT FOR STRIPPING CLAIMS AND
DEFENSES UNDER THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE DOCTRINE
A policy argument for a legal doctrine should explain how the doctrine
benefits society. The following discussion shows that the conventional
policy justification given for stripping claims and defenses under the holder
in due course doctrine fails to satisfy this requirement. The discussion
describes the conventional argument, shows what the argument overlooks,
and then suggests a more persuasive alternative.

49

See id. § 3-1 15(a) (de fining incomplete instrument as “a signed writing,
whether or not issued by the signer, the contents of which show at the time of
signing that it is incom plete b ut that the signer inten ded it to be completed by the
add ition of words or numbe rs”).
50
E.g., Western State Bank v. First Union Bank & Trust, 360 N.E.2d 254,
257 -58 (Ind. Ct. App . 197 7).
51

See U.C.C. § 3-302 (1) (1989) (prerevision version) (“A holder in due course
is a hold er who takes the instrument (a) for value; and (b) in good faith; and (c)
without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against
or claim to it on the part of any p erson .”). The prerevisio n versio n further states:
A holder d oes not becom e a holder in due course of an instrument: (a)
by purchase o f it at judicial sale or b y taking it und er legal proc ess; or (b)
by acqu iring it in taking over an estate; or (c) b y purchasing it as part of a
bulk transactio n not in re gular course of business of the transferor.
Id.

52

A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the
following conditions: (1) That it is complete and regular upon its face; (2) That he
became the holder o f it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been
previously dishonored, if such was the fact; (3) That he took it in good faith and for
value; (4) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no no tice of any infirmity
in the instrum ent or d efect in the title of the person negotiating it.
UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT § 52, 5 U.L.A. 13 (194 3).
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*792 A. THE CONVENTIONAL POLICY ARGUMENT
The conventional policy argument for the holder in due course doctrine
attempts to justify the doctrine’s existence using a two-step syllogism. As
the following Sections document, the argument asserts that (1) stripping
claims and defenses will encourage transactions in negotiable instruments;
and that (2) encouraging transactions in negotiable instruments benefits
society.
1. The Argument that Stripping Claims and Defenses Encourages
Commercial Transactions. A party contemplating buying a negotiable
instrument or taking one in payment from someone other than its maker
may have two concerns relating to his or her right to enforce the instrument.
One is that the maker will have a legal ground for refusing to pay.53 The
other is that someone else will claim ownership of the instrument. 54 The
party taking the instrument, in theory, could address both these worries by
expending time and money to investigate the origin of the negotiable
instrument before purchasing it or taking it in payment. The holder in due
course doctrine, however, makes that effort largely unnecessary by
stripping away claims of ownership and most defenses.55 The doctrine,
therefore, arguably encourages parties to take negotiable instruments when
they would otherwise hesitate.
Numerous courts have articulated this theory of the function of the
holder in due course doctrine. In the landmark case of Unico v. Owen,56 for
example, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated: “The basic philosophy of
the holder in due course status is to encourage free negotiability of
commercial paper by removing certain anxieties of one who takes the paper
as an innocent purchaser knowing no reason why the paper is not as sound
as its face would indicate.”57 The Indiana Court of Appeals offered a
comparable explanation of the policy in Western State Bank v. First Union
Bank & Trust Co.:58
*793 The purpose of conferring HDC [i.e., holder in due course]
status is to encourage and facilitate the circulation of commercial
paper. It is sometimes said that the holder in due course doctrine
53

LARY LAWRENCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO PAYMENT SYSTEM S 53
(1997).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
232 A.2d 405 (N.J. 196 7).
57
Id. at 410.
58
360 N.E .2d 2 54 (Ind. C t. App . 197 7).
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is like oil in the wheels of commerce and that those wheels would
grind to a quick halt without such lubrication.” White and Summers,
Uniform Commercial Code, p. 457. It permits a specified class of
holders to receive negotiable instruments free of the risks of claims
or defenses which might be valid against the original recipient.
These risks are twofold. First, the HDC is assured that he will not
lose any action brought to enforce the instrument due to such claims
or defenses. This is the substantive effect of the rule. Second, and
perhaps just as important, the holder is assured that should he
acquire HDC status he will not incur high transaction costs in the
form of protracted litigation when seeking to enforce the contract.
This is the procedural effect of the rule.59
Other judicial opinions, both old and new, also state this conventional
understanding of how stripping claims and defenses encourages transactions. 60
A variety of academic works reiterate this idea. In perhaps the most
frequently cited article on the subject, Professor Grant Gilmore explained
that the good faith purchaser “is protected not because of his praiseworthy
character, but to the end that commercial transactions may be engaged in
without elaborate investigation of property rights.”61 In other words, a
party may purchase or pay *794 a negotiable instrument without knowing
for sure how the person in possession acquired it. A leading treatise by
Professors William Hawkland and Lary Lawrence similarly asserts: “To
encourage the purchase of negotiable instruments, it is essential that a good
faith purchaser receive his bargained for exchange. The Code establishes
the status of holder in due course to help ensure this result.”62 The
59

Id. at 258.
E.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Litton Sys., 599 F.2d 488, 493-94 (2d Cir. 1979)
(quoting Gilmore on value of preventing embarrassment in commercial transactions); Barnett Bank v. Regency Highland Condominium Ass’n, 452 So. 2d 587,
591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (stating underlying policy to promote commercial
transactions without “elaborate investigation” of process and “in reliance on the
contract rights of one who offers them for sale or to secure a loan”); Sabine v.
Paine, 119 N.E. 849, 850 (N.Y . 191 8) (discussing prevention of embarrassme nt in
com merc ial transac tions).
61
Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE
L.J. 1057 , 105 7 (1954 ).
62
4 HAWKLAND & LAW RE NC E, supra note 10, § 3-30 2: 01 , at 416 ; see also
5A RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIF OR M COMM ERCIAL CODE § 3-302: 3, at 590 (3d ed. 1995) (paraphrasing policy argument stated
in Unico decisio n).
60
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doctrine, to put it another way, prevents unknown claims and defenses from
diminishing the apparent value of an instrument purchased in good faith.
Law school textbooks typically explain the function of the doctrine in the
same way. 63
Some room for disagreement does exist. Contrary to the sources cited
above, this author does not believe that stripping away claims and defenses
necessarily encourages transactions. As this Article suggests further
below,64 stripping claims and defenses in some instances simply may raise
the price of instruments and may not promote transfers. Yet, as will be
shown,65 even if the doctrine does facilitate transactions, that effect alone
cannot justify the existence of the doctrine.
2. The Argument that Increased Transactions May Benefit Society. The
conventional policy argument does not merely claim that the holder in due
course doctrine encourages third parties to buy negotiable instruments or
take them in payment. It also posits that the facilitated transactions benefit
society. Discussions of the holder in due course doctrine frequently cite the
following three putative examples of benefits.66
First, by encouraging third parties to buy notes, the holder in due course
doctrine may reduce the price of credit or make credit *795 available when
it otherwise would not be.67 Small banks, for example, can make more
63

See, e.g., PETER A. ALCES & MARION W . BENFIELD, CASES,
P RO B LE M S AND M A T ERIALS ON PAYM ENT SY STEM S 102-03 (1993)
(reprinting part of Gilmore’s article); STEVE NICKLES ET AL., MODERN
COMM ERCIAL PAPER: THE NEW LAW OF NEGO TIABLE INSTRUMENTS
(AND RELA TE D CO MM ERC IAL PA PER ) 231 (199 4) (stating that “the
protection of purchases ‘in due cou rse’ “ and other factors “reflect a b ody o f law
intended to facilitate trad e in instrum ents”).
64
Infra Part IV.B.1.
65
Infra Part III.B.
66
See gen erally Curtis N yquist, A Spectrum Theo ry of Negotiability, 78 MARQ.
L. REV.. 897, 922 (1995) (listing additional examples of potential benefits of the
doc trine).
67
E. ALLAN FARNSWORT H, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NEGOTIABLE INS TR UM EN TS 89 (4 th ed. 1 993 ) (“[A] buyer’s ability to relinquish most
defenses as against a financing agency when signing a negotiable promissory note,
may make credit available when it otherwise would be denied or may make credit
availab le to the buyer at more favorable terms than would otherwise be available.”);
JAMES J. WHITE & ROB ERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMM ERCIAL
CODE § 14-1, at 503 (4th ed. 1995) (arguing that holder in due course doctrine
“facilitates the flow of capital from large lenders to the seller to an individual
consumer. In theory it does that by causing lenders to purchase consumer paper and
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home loans if they can resell the promissory notes that they receive from
borrowers to larger banks or other investors. The larger banks and investors
will be more willing to buy the notes, or will pay a higher price, if they can
take them free from claims and defenses.
Second, by encouraging banks to grant credit for deposited checks, the
holder in due course doctrine may improve the check collection system.68
When a bank customer deposits a check, the bank generally does not have
to give the customer credit for the check immediately.69 Many banks,
however, advance credit to their customers upon deposit as a courtesy.
Although other factors may also influence this decision, the banks know
that they will become holders in due course of deposited checks to the
extent that the depositors withdraw credit that they give.70 Holder in due
course status affords them a measure of protection because, if a check
bounces, they will have the right to enforce it against the drawer free from
claims and defenses.71 The doctrine thus may give depositors quicker
access to their money.
Third, by encouraging people to take negotiable instruments in payment,
the holder in due course doctrine facilitates the creation of substitutes for
cash. In the past century, before the government issued paper currency,
banks issued notes in which they promised *796 to pay money to the
holder.72 Merchants would take these notes in payment because they knew
that, under the holder in due course doctrine, the banks could not assert a
defense to payment. During the twentieth century, the practice of issuing
bank notes has died out, but banks still create some cash substitutes.
Cashier’s checks, for example, often go from a bank to a remitter and then

thus to use their capital to allow individual lende rs and merchants to do business
with the consumer” ).
68
W HIT E & SUMMER S, supra note 6 7, § 1 4-1, at 503 ; Nyquist, supra note
66, at 936 .
69
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 229 .10(c), .12(b)-(c) (1996) (setting forth sched ule for when
credit must be given for most types of checks); U.C.C. § 4-215(e) (1995) (stating
rule for other c hecks).
70
To beco me a holder in due course, a bank--like anyone else--must give value
for the instrum ent. U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(2)(i) (1995). A depositary bank gives value
when it acquires a security interest in a d epo sited check. Id. § 4-211. A bank can
acquire a security interest by giving a depositor c redit for a deposited check before
it clears, if the custom er withd raws the credit. Id. § 4-2 10(a)(1).
71
Id. § 3-3 05(b).
72
Gilmore, supra note 1 4, at 45 2; Sinc lair, supra note 1 3, at 63 4-35 .
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to a payee.73 The payee may be willing to take the check because the payee
knows that the bank cannot assert a defense to payment against a holder in
due course. For example, the bank cannot assert that the remitter failed to
pay for the instrument.
Although the holder in due course doctrine theoretically might have
these effects, critics have expressed several reasons for discounting the
overall benefit of the doctrine. Many scholars, for example, have argued
that the holder in due course doctrine has less value now than it may have
had in prior centuries because commercial practices have changed.74 As
discussed more fully below,75 they argue that despite the theoretical
benefits of the holder in due course doctrine, consumers, businesses, and
banks now rely on it only in a small percentage of payment transactions.
This criticism, if valid, would suggest that legislatures probably have more
important topics to worry about than the holder in due course doctrine. The
criticism, however, does not undermine the theory behind the conventional
policy argument. Even if commercial practices have changed in general, the
doctrine still could encourage beneficial transactions in some circumstances.
*797 Other critics have argued that the holder in due course doctrine
might sometimes encourage transactions for inappropriate reasons. Most
significantly, if applicable, the doctrine might make it easier for unscrupu-

73

See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(11) (defining remitter as person who “purchases an
instrument from its issuer if the instrument is payable to an identified person other
than the purchaser”); id. § 3-302 cmt. 4 (describ ing this kind of transaction in first
case).
74
Gilmore, supra note 1 4; Ro nald J. Mann, Searching for Neg otiab ility in
Payment and Cred it System s, 44 UCLA L. REV. 951 passim (1997); James S.
Rogers, The Irrelevance of Neg otiab le Instrument Concepts in the Law of the
Check-Based Payment System, 65 TEX. L. REV. 929 (198 7); see also James S.
Roge rs, The My th of Negotiability, 31 B.C. L. REV. 265, 317-18 (1990); Albert J.
Rosenthal, Negotiability--Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM . L. REV. 375, 401 (1971)
(concluding that “today, nego tiability, and specifically the protectio ns of ho lders in
due course, are not necessary or even helpful in fostering the flow of commerce”);
Rub in, supra note 8, at 788 (noting that in many traditio nal settings, negotiability
how has “limited c omm ercial relevanc e”). But cf. W HIT E & SUMMER S, supra
note 67, § 14-1, at 503-04 (noting that significant amount of litigation involving
holder in due course doctrine continues to occur, which suggests that the doctrine
still has some importance in com merc ial transac tions); N yquist, supra note 66, at
902 (noting many w ays in which nego tiability remains imp ortant).
75
Infra Part V.A.
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lous merchants to defraud unsophisticated consumers.76 For example,
merchants might take notes in payment for goods or services, sell the notes
to a holder in due course, and then fail to perform to the consumer’s
satisfaction. The holder in due course doctrine would strip away the unwary
consumer’s defenses, and require the consumer to pay the note.
In response to this criticism, federal and state law now limits the ability
of consumers to make negotiable notes. The Federal Trade Commission has
promulgated a regulation making it an unfair or deceptive act or practice for
a merchant to take an installment sale or lease contract (including a note)
from a consumer unless the contract contains a clause stating that the
consumer may assert defenses against all subsequent assignees. 77 A
number of states have also adopted provisions from a model statute called
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C.) that prevents merchants
from taking negotiable instruments, other than checks, from consumers.78
These limitations reduce the harm that the holder in due course doctrine
might cause, and thus strengthen the conventional policy argument for
preserving the doctrine in other circumstances.
*798 B. WHAT THE CONVENTIONAL POLICY ARGUMENT
OVERLOOKS

76

See Vern Countryman, The Holder in Due Cou rse and Other Anachronisms
in Consumer Cred it, 52 T EX . L. RE V. 1, 2-11 (1973) (explaining ho w hold er in
due course doctrine presents obstacle to consumer defrauded by merchant); Ralph
J. Rohner, Holder in Due Cou rse in Consumer Transa ctions: Requiem, Rev ival, or
Reformation, 60 C OR NE LL L. REV. 503, 515 (197 5) (no ting that holder in due
course doctrine has negative consequences for those “victimized by deceptive sales
practices, shod dy goods, and ine pt services”); R osenthal, supra note 74, at 378-85
(comparing holder in due course doctrine’s application when poo r consumer pays
for inoperable refrigerator with negotiable note or midd le class consumer p ays with
check).
77
16 C .F.R. § § 43 3.1-.2 (1997). For an influential commentary on the federal
regulations, see M ichael F. Sturley, The Legal Impact of the Federal Trade
Com mission’s Holder in Due Cou rse Notice on a Negotiable Instrument: How
Clever Are the Rascals at the FTC?, 68 N .C. L. R EV . 953 (1990).
78
See U.C .C.C. § 3.307 (1974) (“With respect to a consumer credit sale or
consumer lease, the creditor may not take a negotiable instrument other than a check
....”); U.C.C. § 3-302(g) (sub ordinating holder in due co urse doctrine to “any law
limiting status as a holder in due course in [a] particular class of transactions”). For
a list of states that have adop ted the U.C .C.C. or comparable provisions, see 1
CONSUMER CRED . GUIDE (CC H)) P 505, at 1083-98 (July 18, 1995-Nov. 18,
199 7).

16

THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE DOCTRINE AS A DEFAULT RULE

Even if the conventional policy argument for the holder in due course
doctrine withstands the criticism described above, it still has a fundamental
shortcoming. The conventional argument rests on an unstated assumption
that, in the absence of the holder in due course doctrine, assignees of
negotiable instruments would have to take them subject to claims and
defenses, and they therefore could not obtain the benefits that the holder in
due course doctrine provides. This assumption lacks validity.
Contract law, as described above, ordinarily provides that the assignee
of contractual rights takes the rights subject to any defenses applicable
against the assignor.79 This general rule, however, has an important
exception that the conventional policy argument for the holder in due
course doctrine overlooks. In particular, a contract may grant immunity to
subsequent assignees through a “waiver of defense” clause. A waiver of
defense clause (also known as a “cut off” or “hell or high water” clause)
says that the obligor under the contract waives the right to assert defenses
against subsequent assignees.80
For example, again suppose that a business promises to pay $1000 to a
furniture dealer in exchange for a desk and a chair. Ordinarily, as noted
above, if the furniture dealer assigned the contract to a third party, the
business would not lose its right to assert defenses. If the furniture dealer
did not deliver the goods, the business could refuse to pay the assignee. 81
The result, however, would change if the contract contained a waiver of
defense clause saying: “The buyer will not assert against an assignee of this
contract any defense that it might have against the furniture dealer.” This
clause would ensure that, even if the holder in due course doctrine did not
apply, the assignee would *799 take the contractual rights free of defenses.
The contract could include a similar clause guaranteeing that the buyer
would pay the person possessing the contract even if someone else claimed
to have the right to payment. 82

79

Supra notes 1 8-19 and accompa nying text.
For a thorough discussion of waiver of defense clauses under modern contract
law, see D avid F risch & Henry D. Gab riel, Much Ado About Nothing: Achieving
Essential Neg otiab ility in an Electronic Environment, 31 ID AH O L. REV. 747,
760-72 (1995). See also 6 AN DE RSON , supra note 62, § 3-305: 5, at 14-15
(same); FA RN SW OR TH , supra note 1 8, § 1 1.8, at 813 (same ).
81
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT S § 336(1) (1981)
(explaining that assignee is vulnera ble to defenses of obligor).
82
See Frisch & Gabriel, supra note 80, at 770-72 (suggesting ways to effect
such rule by co ntract).
80
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Nothing in Article 3 prohibits parties from using waiver of defense
clauses to replicate the effects of the holder in due course doctrine. Indeed,
an official comment to Article 3 even suggests that option:
[T]he immediate parties to an order or promise that is not [a
negotiable] instrument may provide by agreement that one or more
of the provisions of Article 3 determine their rights and obligations
under the writing.... An example of such an agreement is a provision
that a transferee of the writing has the rights of a holder in due
course stated in Article 3 if the transferee took rights under the
writing in good faith, for value, and without notice of a claim or
defense.83
This statement reveals that the Article 3 drafters did not intend the U.C.C.
to preempt waiver of defense clauses.
Modern contract law also does not generally forbid waiver of defense
clauses. On the contrary, pursuant to these clauses, courts have stripped
away a variety of defenses, such as failure of consideration,84 breach of
warranty,85 misrepresentation,86 and nonoccurrence of a condition.87 The
courts have generally seen no reason to hold that parties to a contract
cannot waive their rights *800 in favor of an assignee. For example, in
Walter J. Hieb Sand & Gravel, Inc., the Kentucky Court of Appeals
explained:
There is no question but that the seller and buyer here could have
executed negotiable indicia of the sale which would have cut off the
defense pleaded here. Thus there seems to be no logical reason why
they could not impart to their contract limited aspects of negotiability with the purpose of facilitating the financing of their transaction.88

83

U.C .C. § 3 -104 cmt. 2.
E.g., Young v. John Deere Plow Co., 115 S.E.2 d 77 0, 773 (Ga. Ct. App.
1960); Commercial C redit C orp. v. Biagi, 136 N.E.2d 580, 581 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956).
85
E.g., Straight v. James Talcott, Inc., 329 F.2 d 1, 3 (10th Cir. 1964 ); United
States ex rel. Administrator of Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Troy-Parisian, Inc., 115 F.2d
224, 226 (9th Cir. 1940); Morgan v. John Deere Co ., 394 S.W .2d 4 53, 4 54 (Ky.
1965); Walter J. Hieb Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Univers al C .I.T. Credit Corp., 332
S.W.2d 619, 622 (Ky. 1959); National City Bank v. Prospect Syndicate, Inc., 10
N.Y .S.2d 759 , 765 (M un. Ct. 1 939 ).
86
E.g., General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Tidenberg, 428 P.2d 33, 36 (N.M . 1967).
87
E.g., Geo rgia R.R. B ank & T rust Co. v. Doolittle, 252 S.E.2d 556, 558 (S.C.
197 9).
88
332 S.W .2d at 622 .
84
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Other courts have justified upholding waiver of defense clauses on similar
grounds.89
Despite the general enforceability of waiver of defense clauses, four
limitations deserve mention. First, the same laws that limit the ability of
consumers to make negotiable instruments also restrict their use of waiver
of defense clauses. The Federal Trade Commission regulations, described
above,90 generally require consumer credit sale or lease contracts, whether
or not they qualify as negotiable instruments, to contain a clause preserving
defenses.91 The U.C.C.C. likewise prohibits waiver of defense clauses in
consumer credit sale and lease contracts.92
Second, Article 9 of the U.C.C. regulates waiver clauses in assignments
of contracts that involve security interests. Section 9-206(1) makes waiver
clauses in such assignments generally enforceable,93 and courts have
upheld them in numerous cases *801 under this provision.94 This section,
however, contains a few restrictions. For instance, it only permits waiver
of defenses in favor of an assignee who has taken the assigned right in good

89

See, e.g., Troy-Parisian, Inc., 115 F.2d at 226 (“[T]here would appear to be
no good reason why [parties] may not by agreem ent imp art to [their contract]
limited elements of negotiab ility.”).
90
Supra note 7 7 and acco mpa nying text.
91
See 16 C .F.R. § 433 .1(i) (1997 ) (defining consumer cred it contract); id. §
433 .2 (requiring consumer credit contracts to contain provision preserving claims
and defenses).
92
See U.C.C.C. § 1.301 (12) (1974) (defining “con sumer cred it sale”); id. §
1.301(14) (defining “con sumer lease” ); id. § 3.404(1) (1974) (subjecting assignees
of rights of seller or lessor in consumer credit sale or consumer lease to all claims
and defenses); id. § 3.4 05(4) (prohib iting waive r clauses).
93
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule
for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or
lessee that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense
which he may have against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an
assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and
without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type
which may be asserted against a holder in due cou rse of a nego tiable
instrument unde r the Article on N egotiable Instruments (Article 3).
U.C.C. § 9-2 06(1) (1995 ); see also id. § 2A-407(1) (1995) (making waiver of
defense clause stand ard term of finance lease).
94
E.g., Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. Mark Ford, Inc., 438 A.2d 705, 708 (Conn.
1980); Block v. Ford M otor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 2 28, 232-33 (D .C. 1972);
Chemical Ban k v. Rinden Pro f’l Ass’n, 49 8 A.2 d 70 6, 71 0-11 (N.H . 198 5).
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faith, for value, and without notice of defenses.95 In addition, the provision
does not permit parties to waive real defenses such as infancy.96 At least
one court also has held that the provision only allows buyers and lessors of
goods (and not other parties) to waive defenses,97 but commentators have
generally criticized this view.98
Third, some secondary authorities indicate that, while waiver of defense
clauses may cut off defenses to payment based on breach of warranty, they
may not strip away other defenses.99 This *802 position, however, conflicts
with decisions, such as those noted above,100 in which courts have stripped
away other types of defenses. Section 9-206(1), moreover, overrules any
contrary decisions to the extent that they involve security interests; this
section permits parties to waive all defenses except the “real” defenses
applicable even against a holder in due course.101

95

U.C .C. § 9 -206 (1).
Id.
97
Suburban Trust & Sav. Bank v. University of Del., 910 F. Supp. 1009,
1016-18 (D. D el. 1995). The court reasoned that U.C.C. section 9-31 8(1) subjects
an assignee to all defenses applicable to the assignor and that section 9-206(1)
literally creates an exception only for sellers and lessors. Id. at 1016 . The co urt also
concluded that in contracts involving security interests, section 9-206(1) supp lants
any common-law rule generally validating waiver of defense clauses. Id. at 1018.
98
See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE U NIFORM COM MERC IAL CODE P 11.04[4], at 11-23 n.70
(1993) (“The limited scope of the U.C.C. language [in section 9 -206 (1)] should be
treated as a drafting error, and the courts should by analogy extend the rationale to
any agreeme nt that may be the subject of an Article 9 assignment.”); GRANT
GILMORE, SECUR ITY INT EREST S IN PERS ONA L PROP ERT Y § 41.5, at
1095 (1965) (“Th e section is written in terms of present sales (and leases) of goods;
however, if the langua ge is read in a cheerful spirit, there is no insupe rable difficulty
in app lying it to transactions which are no t sales and leases ....”).
99
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 1 cm t. f, illus. 10,
11 (197 9) (drawing this distinction); U.C.C. § 9-206(1) cm t. 1 (noting that courts
have allowed waiver clauses “to operate to cut off at least defenses based on breach
of warranty”); Frisc h & G abriel, supra note 80, at 764 (indicating that some courts
do not allow waiver of frau d defense); G ilmore , supra note 61, at 1095-96
(asserting that waiver of defense clauses do not preclude defense of failure of
consideration). Older cases support this view. See, e.g., American Nat’l Bank v.
A.G. Somerville, Inc., 216 P. 376, 37 9 (Cal. 19 23) (waiver of defense clause
voidable b ecause maker of contract received no consideration).
100
Supra notes 8 4-87 .
101
See U.C.C. § 9-206(1) (referring to de fenses in A rticle 3); id. § 3-305(a)(1)
(1995) (identifying so-called real defenses).
96
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Fourth, courts in some jurisdictions have struck down waiver clauses on
grounds that they violated public policy or were unconscionable in the
circumstances involved.102 Many of these cases, however, involved
consumer contracts and, thus, do not appear to have general application.103
Other decisions predate the U.C.C. and rest on a controversial view that the
N.I.L. (the U.C.C.’s predecessor) prohibited attempts to effect negotiability
by contract.104 The U.C.C., as noted, contains no such prohibition.
These four limitations show that courts may not uphold waiver of
defense clauses in all circumstances. Yet, in most instances in which parties
can use a negotiable instrument to allow an assignee to take free of claims
and defenses, they can effect a comparable result by inserting a waiver of
defense clause in an ordinary contract. To the extent that courts will uphold
waiver of defense clauses, the need for the holder in due course doctrine
becomes a *803 more complicated issue than the conventional policy
argument suggests.
Although the conventional policy argument for the holder in due course
doctrine describes the benefits of stripping claims and defenses, it does not
explain what the doctrine accomplishes that parties could not achieve with
waiver of defense clauses. In other words, the conventional policy

102

See San Francisco Sec. Corp. v. Phoenix Motor Co., 220 P. 229, 232 (Ariz.
1923) (striking down contract violating public policy); Fairfield Credit Corp. v.
Do nnelly, 264 A.2d 547, 550 (Conn. 19 69) (striking d own contra ct violating pub lic
policy); Dearborn Motors Credit Corp. v. Neel, 337 P.2d 992, 1002 (Kan. 1959)
(striking down contract violating public policy); Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 148
N.E.2d 385, 389 (Mass. 1958) (striking down contract violating public policy);
Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405, 418 (N.J . 1967 ) (invalidating unconscionable
contract); Motor Contract C o. v. V an de r Vo lgen, 298 P . 705 , 707 (W ash. 1931)
(invalidating co ntract under p ublic p olicy).
103
See, e.g., Fairfield Cred it Corp., 264 A.2d at 547 (dealing with retail sales
installment contra ct); Unico, 232 A.2d at 407 (dealing with installment contract for
purchase o f stereo records).
104
See Frederick K. B eutel, Neg otiab ility by Contrac t: A Problem in Statutory
Interpretation, 28 IL L. L. REV .. 205, 213-24 (193 3) (discussing but rejecting
theory that N.I.L. made waiver o f defense clauses contrary to public policy).
Although some courts initially held that the N.I.L. precluded using waiver of
defense clauses, o ther co urts later reached the o ppo site conclusion. See Frisch &
Gabriel, supra note 8 0, at 764 (discussing general application of courts allowing
waiver in simple breach o f warran ty cases); Gilmore, supra note 61, at 1096-97
(discussing Utah case where waiver was effective in simple breach of warranty
claim).

THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE DOCTRINE AS A DEFAULT RULE 21
argument does not show how society benefits from having provisions like
sections 3-305 and 3-306 on the books.
C. UNDERSTANDING SECTIONS 3-305 AND 3-306 AS DEFAULT
RULES
A better policy argument for sections 3-305 and 3-306 is that these
sections serve simply as default rules. A review of some basic principles of
contract law makes this argument easier to understand. The law enforces
promises to pay money in the future--whether in the form of a check, a
promissory note, or an ordinary contract--for a widely accepted economic
reason. In particular, enforcing promises to take action in the future
generally promotes efficiency by allowing parties to enter exchanges in
which both parties do not have to perform simultaneously to protect
themselves.105
If the law did not enforce promises to pay money in the future,
commercial transactions would generally require immediate cash payment.
Sellers would hesitate to sell property or services on credit because they
would have no legal means of insuring that they would receive payment.106
That result would harm society because the possibility of credit enables the
formation of many beneficial bargains that otherwise would not occur.
When the law enforces a promise, it generally gives effect to all the
terms of the promise. Absent incapacity, fraud, or duress, parties to a
contract presumably set the terms of their promises *804 through a
bargaining process.107 Refusing to enforce some terms may deny one party
a portion of the benefit expected from the bargain while giving the other a

105

See RICH AR D A . P OSN ER , E CO NO M IC AN ALY SIS O F T HE LA W §
4.1, at 81 (3d ed. 1986 ) (“[T ]he fund amental functio n of co ntract law ... is to deter
peo ple from behaving opp ortunistically toward their contra cting parties, in order to
encourage the optimal timing of economic activity and make costly self-protective
measures un necessary.”).
106
See O.W . HO LM ES JR., THE CO MM ON LAW 248-50 (1881) (explaining
that, if law did not enforce promises to take action in future , parties m ight reso rt to
socially harmful measures such as hostage taking to persuad e others to keep their
promises).
107
See REST AT EM EN T (S EC ON D) O F CO NT RACT S ch. 7 intro. note (1981)
( “Contract law has trad itionally relied in large part on the premise that the parties
be ab le to make legally enfo rceab le agreements on the ir own terms, freely arrived
at by the process of barga ining.”).
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windfall.108 For this reason, courts generally should and do enforce waiver
of defense clauses in a contract to pay money, just as they enforce terms
setting the interest rate or the payment date.109
While, in theory, bargaining should produce efficient exchanges, the
process has a cost. Parties forming contracts often must dicker for terms
they want until they reach agreement. They then must expend resources to
express the terms clearly. For example, they may take time and pay
attorneys to prepare a carefully drafted written contract.
The law, however, can reduce the cost of bargaining by establishing
default rules that reflect terms most people favor in a given context. For
example, although parties may insert a clause liquidating damages in the
event of a breach,110 they do not have to expend this effort. Instead, if they
say nothing, the law will supply a term stating that they will receive
expectation damages.111 Default rules of this nature promote efficiency by
giving parties to contracts the terms that they want, while sparing them the
transaction costs of setting terms.112

108

See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV.
L. REV.. 741 , 745 -48 (1 982 ) (“[A] bargain pro mise should be enforced to its full
extent.”).
109
The need for exceptions to the general enforceability of bargains remains a
subject of debate. Com pare POSNER, supra note 1 05, at 104 (“Econo mic analysis
revea ls no grounds other than fraud, incapacity, and duress ... for allowing a party
to repudiate the bargain that he made in entering into the contract.”), with
Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 748 -84 (advo cating additional exceptions to address
exploitation of distress, transac tional incapacity, susceptibility to unfair persuasion,
and price ignora nce).
110
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981)
(autho rizing liqu idated dam ages).
111
See id. § 34 7 (stating presumptio n of expectation damages).
112
See Michael Klausner, Corp orations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Con tracts, 81 V A. L. R EV . 757 , 826 (1995) (“As default rules are currently
understood, their content should mimic the actual contracts that a majority of
[[[parties] would adopt in the absence of transaction costs. The social value of
default rules is measured in terms of reduced transaction costs.”); And rew K ull,
Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Rem edies, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 43 (1991) (“The standard approach to the choice of default rules
recommends that they be those the parties to a typical contract would be most likely
to select for themselves.”). For a discussion of poten tial exceptions to this rule
designed to limit strategic behavior, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic
Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J.
729 (1992).
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*805 This discussion leads to the alternative policy argument for the
holder in due course doctrine. In particular, it suggests that the doctrine
should exist because it could reduce the cost of bargaining. Although
parties could recreate the effects of the doctrine by drafting waiver of
defense clauses, the doctrine itself spares them the effort.113 Parties who
waive claims and defenses against subsequent assignees merely have to
make negotiable instruments within the scope of Article 3.114 The doctrine
will then automatically supply the necessary terms.
This alternative policy argument has two distinct advantages over the
conventional policy argument. Most significantly, it provides a reason for
the doctrine’s continued existence, even though courts generally uphold
waiver of defense clauses. In addition, it eliminates the need for speculating
about the exact reasons parties may have for wanting to waive claims and
defenses. Their particular purposes do not matter. Whatever their reasons,
if competent parties choose to waive claims and defenses, the holder in due
course doctrine may reduce the cost of accomplishing that result.115
D. STRENGTH OF THE REVISED POLICY ARGUMENT
The revised policy argument for the holder in due course doctrine, to
repeat, claims that the doctrine serves as a default rule that saves parties the
expense of drafting waiver of defense clauses. This claim naturally raises
the question of how much savings the doctrine produces. Without an
empirical study, no one can answer *806 this question with certainty. Two
widely different conclusions, however, seem possible.
On the one hand, the doctrine might be saving considerable bargaining
costs because the holder in due course doctrine applies in a large number
of transactions. Americans, after all, enter billions of transactions annually
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Although Professor Edward L. Rubin criticizes the present holder in due
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a mod ern law for the transfer o f commerc ial instruments. Ru bin, supra note 8 , at
796-97. In particular, he recognizes that establishing appropriate default rules can
enhance efficiency. Id.
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See U.C.C. § 3-10 4 (1995 ) (stating formal requirements for negotiable
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115
The policy argument stated here only exp lains why the holder in due course
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attempt to show that everyone should have capacity to waive defenses, either
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desirability of consumer pro tection measures.
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that involve checks and notes within the ambit of Article 3.116 Admittedly,
many of the participants in these transactions do not care about the holder
in due course doctrine because they either do not expect a holder in due
course to take the instrument or they do not think that any claims or
defenses will arise. 117 An unknown and possibly substantial number,
however, may want assignees to take free from claims and defenses. For
example, banks generally prefer to take negotiable notes when they lend
money. If sections 3-305 and 3-306 did not exist, some banks might insist
on contractual terms that would achieve the same result. Sections 3-305 and
3-306 saves them the effort.
On the other hand, despite the large volume of transactions in negotiable
instruments, the doctrine might not save very much in terms of bargaining
costs because parties can supply their own waiver of defense clauses
inexpensively. Even in the absence of sections 3-305 and 3-306, individuals
and businesses would not have to draft their own contractual terms each
time they wanted to make a note or check. Instead, they could use a
standard form agreement that contained appropriate preprinted contractual
terms. Alternatively, they simply could attach a legend incorporating by
reference a set of standard terms.
In fact, in many payment transactions not involving negotiable
instruments, the participants already rely on form agreements to set the
terms. For example, banks typically issue letters of credit *807 that include
a clause subjecting them to the terms of the Uniform Customs and Practice
for Documentary Credits, a privately established protocol published by the
International Chamber of Commerce.118 Likewise, when using a credit
116

Consumers and businesses write over 60 b illion checks annually. See Pam ela
Sebastian, Busine ss Bulletin: A Special Background Report on Trends in Indu stry
and Finance, WA LL ST. J., Jan. 23, 1997, at A1 (discussing continued use of paper
checks in era in which electronic banking has be com e increasingly popular). They
also issue negotiable notes in connection with short-term commercial borrowing,
home mortgages, student loans, and so forth. See gen erally Mann, supra note 74,
at 966-84 (discussing mode rn use o f notes in variety of contexts).
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See RIC HA RD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., PAYM ENT SY STEM S 89 (5th ed.
1993) (noting rise of credit extension methods not reliant upon note transfer to third
party and doctrine ’s unimp ortance when ob ligor lacks defenses).
118
See U.C .C. § 5 -103 cmt. 2 (1995) (explaining that, because of abbreviated
nature of Article 5 and fact that law beyond Article 5 will often determine rights and
liabilities in letter-of-credit transaction s, parties and courts should look to customs
and practice for guidance). Article 5 of the U.C.C., which governs letters o f credit,
generally permits parties to opt out of statutory rules and establish their own by
agree ment. Id. § 5-1 03(c).
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card, consumers typically sign a slip that contains a legend (in tiny print)
saying: “Customer agrees to perform the obligations set forth in the
Cardholder’s agreement with the Issuer.” This legend subjects the
transaction to a form agreement established by the credit card industry.119
These competing considerations make the benefit of the holder in due
course doctrine difficult to determine. This lack of certainty, however,
should not condemn the doctrine. Even if the doctrine saves only a small
amount of transaction costs, in theory, little harm can come from the
doctrine’s existence. Current regulations and statutes, as noted, generally
protect consumers. Other parties may opt out of the doctrine by making
non-negotiable instruments, with or without waiver clauses.
IV. THE POLICY ARGUMENT FOR LIMITING HOLDER IN DUE
COURSE STATUS
The holder in due course doctrine does not apply every time a person
acquires a negotiable instrument by assignment. Instead, as noted above, a
person can become a holder in due course--and thus take an instrument free
of claims and defenses--only by satisfying the numerous requirements set
forth in section 3-302.120 For example, a person must take the instrument in
good faith, for value, and without notice of claims, defenses, and other
problems in order to become a holder in due course.121
*808 The requirements listed in section 3-302 have two conventional
justifications, one based on considerations of fairness and the other on a
desire to shape incentives. The following discussion describes and criticizes
the standard arguments and then suggests an alternative. It proposes that,
like sections 3-305 and 3-306, section 3-302 serves as a default rule and
should exist principally for the purpose of reducing transaction costs.
A. THE CONVENTIONAL FAIRNESS AND INCENTIVES POLICY
ARGUMENTS
The conventional fairness argument for the requirements in section
3-302 rests on an assumption concerning the distributional effects of the
holder in due course doctrine. The argument presumes that stripping away
claims and defenses provides a benefit to the person taking the instrument
while placing a burden on the person who made the instrument. The
119

See Mary Elizabeth M atthews, Cred it Cards--Authorized and Unauthorized
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argument then justifies the requirements in section 3-302 as appropriate
limitations designed to prevent unfairness to the maker of an instrument
who may lose his or her defenses.
A simple statement of the conventional fairness argument appears in a
leading treatise by Professors Hawkland and Lawrence:
A holder in due course takes free from virtually all claims and
defenses of all parties and is protected from other risks which would
defeat his expectations. Since these protections are usually at the
expense of an innocent party, the Code establishes strict requirements for determining holder in due course status. These requirements attempt to separate those purchasers who are worthy of
protection from those purchasers who are not.122
To understand the argument, suppose a homeowner issues a note to a
bank, and the bank then negotiates123 the note to an investor.*809 The
homeowner may have a defense to payment, such as fraud on the part of the
bank. The conventional fairness argument would assume that stripping way
that defense would burden the homeowner and benefit the investor. The
requirements in section 3-302 arguably restrict the application of the holder
in due course doctrine to ensure that no unfairness occurs.
The rule that a person must give value for an instrument to become a
holder in due course124 provides an example. The conventional fairness
argument would say that the homeowner should not suffer the burden of
having a defense stripped away when no good reason exists for conferring
that benefit on the investor. If the investor has not given value to acquire
the instrument, he will not lose anything by being subjected to defenses.
Fairness, according to the conventional argument, should preclude stripping
away these defenses in such a case. 125
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See U.C.C. § 3-201(a) (defining “negotiation” as “a transfer of possession,
whether voluntary or involuntary, of an instrument by a person other than the issuer
to a person who thereby beco mes a holder”).
124
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The conventional fairness argument uses similar reasoning to explain
why a holder in due course must take an instrument in good faith and
without notice of claims or defenses. A person who acts in bad faith,
according to the argument, should not get the benefit of immunity from
defenses at the expense of the innocent person who made an instrument.126
Similarly, in fairness, a person who knows an instrument has a problem
should not have the right to take the instrument and impose the problem on
its maker.127
*810 The conventional incentives argument for the requirements in
section 3-302 rests on a different assumption. The incentives argument
postulates that stripping defenses will encourage transfers of instruments,
and that not stripping defenses will discourage transfers of instruments. In
other words, it assumes that an investor would prefer to buy an instrument
free of defenses than to buy one that comes subject to defenses. The
argument then justifies the limitations on who can become a holder in due
course as serving to curb the incentives to take instruments when encouraging transactions would cause harm or serve no societal purpose.
For example, as noted above, section 3-302 says, among other things,
that a person cannot become a holder in due course of an instrument that
has gaps or irregularities or that has become overdue.128 The traditional
incentives argument supports these restrictions on grounds that no good
reason exists for creating an incentive for people to buy such instruments.
Professors Robert Jordan and William Warren, who drafted much of the
revised version of Article 3, summarized the conventional incentives
argument for this rule by asking rhetorically: “If negotiability is a doctrine
to promote the free flow of instruments, what social or economic gain is
achieved by encouraging the currency of stale, irregular, or incomplete
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See Neil O. Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Pap er: The
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that perso n must take instrument without evidence it is overdue to qualify as holder
in due course).

28

THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE DOCTRINE AS A DEFAULT RULE

instruments?”129 In other words, society does not need to create incentives
to take such instruments, and thus the holder in due course doctrine should
not apply.
The conventional incentives argument attempts to justify other
requirements in section 3-302 in a similar way. For example, the argument
justifies denying holder in due course status to a person who acquires an
instrument by judicial process on grounds that such a person does not need
the incentive that stripping away claims and defenses would provide.130
The requirement of good *811 faith arguably strives to limit the incentive
to take instruments in bad faith, which could harm society. 131
B. CRITICISM OF THE CONVENTIONAL POLICY ARGUMENTS
The conventional fairness and incentives arguments for the requirements
in section 3-302, although widely accepted, have two flaws. First, they do
not take into account the possibility of compensation for risk. Second, and
perhaps more significantly, they see the limitations in section 3-302 as a
means of regulating behavior without recognizing that parties generally can
achieve negotiability without these limitations by using appropriately
drafted waiver of defense clauses.
1. Compensation for Risk. Both the fairness argument and the incentive
argument for conditioning holder in due course status rest on assumptions
that have questionable economic validity. The fairness argument assumes
that stripping away a maker’s defenses may impose risks on the maker in
an unjust manner. This assumption, however, ignores the possibility that
the maker of the instrument could receive compensation for the increased
risk, and thus would suffer no unfairness.
129
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For example, suppose a buyer wants to purchase goods from a seller by
making a note. If the buyer-maker could waive the value requirement, the
seller might offer him more favorable terms; the seller might prefer a note
not subject to the value requirement because eliminating that requirement
might increase the market for the note. The definition of value, as noted
above, does not include an unperformed promise.132 As a result, the
nonwaived value requirement prevents a third party who buys a note on
credit from becoming a holder in due course until after making payment.
*812 Waiving the value requirement, however, would allow a third-party
purchaser for credit to become a holder in due course immediately. This,
in turn, would make a credit sale more attractive to that third party, and
thus might bring the seller more consideration, part of which might pass to
the maker as incentive to waive the value requirement. Therefore, although
the maker may have no defenses against a third party who did not pay
value, the maker might be compensated for this risk and thus would not
unfairly be denied his defenses.
The conventional incentives argument has a similar difficulty. As noted
above, the incentives argument rests on the idea that the holder in due
course doctrine creates incentives for third parties to purchase negotiable
instruments but that restrictions are required to prevent those incentives
from encouraging certain harmful transactions. This assumption, however,
fails to recognize that price adjustments may dilute any incentives that the
holder in due course doctrine otherwise might produce. For example,
suppose that a borrower issues two notes to a bank. One note is negotiable
and the other note is not. Which note would an investor prefer to purchase
from the bank? The question, as put, has no clear answer. Although the
negotiable note will come free from claims and defenses, the investor
almost surely will have to pay more for it than for the non-negotiable note
because the purchase involves less risk. The market, indeed, may adjust the
prices of negotiable notes and non-negotiable notes such that neither note
represents a better overall bargain than the other.133
For this reason, the requirements in section 3-302 that prevent a person
from becoming a holder in due course in certain circumstances may not
limit the incentives for their purchase. Instead, the requirements in some
instances simply may alter the price of these instruments. Purchasers may
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be just as willing to buy the instruments at a lower price and subject to
defenses, as they would at a higher price and free from defenses.
2. Regulatory Effects. In addition to overlooking economic considerations, the conventional policy arguments for restricting holder in due
course status have another fundamental difficulty. *813 The arguments
assume that section 3-302 can regulate conduct to protect innocent parties
and promote socially beneficial transactions. This assumption, however,
ignores the availability of alternatives to negotiable instruments.
As discussed previously,134 parties can generally replicate the holder in
due course doctrine by including waiver of defense clauses in ordinary
contracts. If parties decide that they do not like the restrictions on who can
become a holder in due course under section 3-302, they can draft contracts
including waiver clauses that state different requirements for when
assignees take free from defenses. For example, a waiver of defense clause
could state: “The maker of this note will not assert any defenses against an
assignee, even if the assignee acquires it after it becomes overdue.” This
provision would allow an assignee to avoid one of the holder in due course
requirements currently stated in section 3-302,135 while still enjoying
immunity from the maker’s defenses that holder in due course status would
confer.
The ability to opt out of the Code and tailor waiver of defense clauses
as desired deprives section 3-302 of much of its regulatory effect. The
section cannot control conduct effectively because parties have the ability
to ignore it. A policy argument for the requirements in section 3-302 must
take this alternative into account.
C. UNDERSTANDING SECTION 3-302 AS A DEFAULT RULE
A better policy argument for the eight-requirements qualification as a
holder in due course stated in section 3-302 parallels the argument for
stripping claims and defenses under sections 3-305 and 3-306. In particular,
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the requirements should exist because they potentially could reduce
transaction costs. Although parties can draft their own waiver of defense
clauses and can devise their *814 own requirements for when a waiver
takes place, section 3-302 acts as a default rule that applies to promises
made in the form of negotiable instruments. If parties who wish to waive
claims and defenses favor the default requirements in section 3-302, then
the section can spare them the effort of drafting alternative requirements
themselves. The section serves as a default rule, and thus saves transaction
costs and promotes efficiency.
This revised policy argument avoids the problems associated with the
conventional fairness and incentives arguments. The revised argument does
not ignore the possibility of compensation for risk because it makes no
claims about how stripping claims and defenses burdens or benefits either
party. The revised argument also takes into account the ability of parties to
draft their own waiver clauses; indeed, that possibility serves as part of the
justification for having a set of requirements that most people would choose
if they had to draft their own clauses.
The revised policy argument raises the question of why users of
negotiable instruments would want holders in due course to meet the
numerous specific requirements in section 3-302. The answer to this
question, although perhaps interesting, has mostly academic value. If
section 3-302 exists to save transaction costs, then the reason that people
favor the requirements does not make much difference. So long as section
3-302 saves parties the trouble of drafting their own waiver clauses, then
the section has value, regardless of what requirements it imposes.
With that caveat in mind, most of the requirements in section 3-302
appear to have straightforward economic explanations. Parties making or
purchasing negotiable instruments face several risks. For instance, a person
promising to pay money may worry that he or she will not receive the
agreed-upon consideration. Meanwhile, a person purchasing a negotiable
instrument may worry that the maker will assert a defense to payment. The
parties may shift these risks around, but they generally cannot eliminate
them. Most of the requirements in section 3-302 appear to reflect a desire
to shift the risks to the party who can avoid them at the lowest cost. 136
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*815 For example, suppose that a customer issues a non-negotiable note
to a merchant and the merchant then sells it to a bank. There is a risk in this
transaction that the merchant has given the customer defective goods. The
customer and the bank cannot eliminate this risk. Yet, they can decide who
should bear it between the two of them. If the customer does not waive
defenses against subsequent assignees, then the bank will bear the risk; by
contrast, if the customer does waive defenses, then the customer will bear
the risk.137
In many instances, the customer would prefer to assume the risk because
he has a better ability to assess it. The customer, for example, generally will
know more about the underlying transaction than the bank because he deals
directly with the merchant and obtains possession of the goods. Although
the bank could assess the underlying transaction, it would incur investigation costs that could result in higher prices for the customer. 138 As a result,
the customer may prefer to pay less for the goods and bear the risk himself
instead of paying more for the goods and placing the risk on the bank.139
The customer, accordingly, will make a negotiable instrument which will
give the bank immunity from the risk.
In certain circumstances, however, the customer may not want to
assume the risk. For example, if the bank knows that the customer has a
defense, then the bank can avoid that risk at very little cost simply by not
purchasing the instrument. As a result, the customer may want to place the
risk of loss on the bank in that specific situation. Accordingly, although the
customer ordinarily *816 will waive claims and defenses, the customer will
not waive them when the bank has notice of defenses. Section 3-302, by
137
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denying holder in due course status to one who has notice of defenses,140
implements this rational preference.
Other factors besides shifting risks may explain why people make
negotiable instruments governed by section 3-302, even though they could
opt out of the provision. For example, parties who lack legal sophistication
simply may not realize that they have a choice. In general, however, the
popularity of negotiable instruments suggests that, for whatever reason,
people generally favor (or at least do not oppose) the restrictions on who
can obtain the status of a holder in due course. If they did not like the
requirements, they might draft their own waiver clauses more often.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing portions of this Article have argued that the holder in due
course doctrine should exist, not for the conventional reasons given, but
rather because the doctrine may reduce a specific type of transaction cost.
If the law did not state that parties may take negotiable instruments free
from claims and defenses, some makers of these instruments would want
to draft waiver of defense clauses to implement that rule. The holder in due
course doctrine has social value to the extent that it spares them this
trouble.
This new understanding of the purpose of the holder in due course
doctrine has three important implications. First, it contributes to the
ongoing debate about the importance of the doctrine. Second, it indicates
that efforts to reform the doctrine should focus on insuring that the doctrine
reflects popular desires in commercial transactions. Third, it reveals that
restrictions on using negotiable instruments will have little effect unless
they also apply to waiver of defense clauses.
A. IMPORTANCE OF THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE DOCTRINE
Over the past several decades, and especially following the recent
revision of Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a number of *817
authors have questioned the importance of the holder in due course
doctrine. As noted briefly above, some writers contend that the doctrine no
longer has much relevance because patterns of commerce have changed.141
Professor Edward L. Rubin, for example, surveyed all the major uses of
negotiable instruments in a recent article.142 He concluded that the holder
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in due course doctrine generally does not affect checks and has little impact
on promissory notes. Rubin explained that, with respect to checks, the
holder in due course doctrine almost exclusively serves to protect
check-cashing services that take paychecks from people who do not have
bank accounts.143 Rubin also observed that non-U.C.C. law now prohibits
using negotiable notes in most consumer transactions,144 and that shortterm commercial paper made by large corporations, although negotiable,
does not circulate very much.145 In addition, he noted that even though
banks negotiate mortgage notes, homeowners rarely have defenses against
lenders; thus, the holder in due course doctrine does not greatly affect
them.146 Other writers have expressed some reservations about these
contentions, although they have not rejected them altogether.147
The policy argument developed in this Article has relevance to this
debate. It supports the position that the holder in due course doctrine does
not have much importance, but not for the reasons usually given. Whether
or not the doctrine applies to many transactions, and whether or not courts
use it to decide many cases, the doctrine has little significance; eliminating
it probably would have little practical effect on commerce. If sections 3-305
and 3-306 *818 of the Code did not exist, parties generally could replicate
their effects by adding waiver of defense clauses to their contracts. They
could accomplish this task, as noted above, either by drafting the clauses
themselves or by incorporating them by reference to predrafted provisions.
Their private contracts would then operate in much the same way that
negotiable instruments operate today.
For this reason, legislatures probably should not extensively worry
about the holder in due course doctrine. Perhaps the doctrine saves parties
some time and effort and insures that all businesses follow the same general
rules. Yet, so long as commerce can shape ordinary contracts to suit its
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needs, it could survive without the holder in due course provisions in
Article 3.
B. REFORMING THE DOCTRINE
The new understanding of the holder in due course doctrine also has an
implication for future reforms. In particular, it suggests that proposals for
significant amendments to sections 3-302, 3-305, and 3-306 should
generally produce skepticism. To repeat, a person who wants to waive
claims and defenses in favor of subsequent assignees can accomplish that
result using either a negotiable instrument or an ordinary contract
containing a waiver of defense clause. Yet, most parties who want to waive
defenses choose negotiable instruments. This practice suggests that most
people favor the current status of the holder in due course doctrine or at
least do not see a pressing need to change it.
Even though the doctrine probably does not require revision at present,
the new policy argument provides guidance for determining when and how
to make future amendments. The argument, again, claims that the doctrine
serves to reduce transaction costs by sparing parties the efforts of drafting
their own waiver of defense clauses. In the future, if parties cease using
negotiable instruments and start using waiver of defense clauses, then the
doctrine no longer will provide a savings and will need adjustment so that
it reflects more accurately what most people want.
For example, as described above,148 section 3-302 currently sets forth
eight requirements for becoming a holder in due course. *819 Suppose that
in the future most parties decide they do not like one of these requirements,
and decide to opt out of the doctrine by constructing waiver clauses that
impose only the seven requirements that they favor. An amendment
deleting the eighth requirement would then improve the doctrine.
Determining what to save and what to change will require detailed
empirical study. 149 Some evidence may come from parties that have
decided to opt out of the present rules. One commentator, for example, has
observed that “[f]inancial institutions often [have] preferred to use
waiver-of-defense clauses to avoid some of the cumbersome formalities
inherent in negotiable promissory notes.”150 If substantial evidence shows

148

Supra Part II.B.
See Rub in, supra note 8, at 797 (arguing for empirical research into what
most people wa nt in com merc ial transac tions as m eans o f developing ru les that
reduce transaction costs).
150
FAR NS W OR TH , supra note 1 8, § 1 1.8, at 813 .
149

36

THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE DOCTRINE AS A DEFAULT RULE

that this practice has continued, then perhaps the U.C.C. should shed some
of those formalities and save these institutions the trouble.
C. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
The new understanding of the function of the holder in due course
doctrine has another important implication that concerns restrictions on the
use of negotiable instruments. The policy argument suggests that any
attempt to regulate the use of negotiable instruments may prove ineffective
unless the regulations also apply to waiver of defense clauses in contracts.
Although legislative and administrative bodies sometimes have recognized
this principle in the past, they have not done so in all instances.
The restrictions on the ability of consumers to make negotiable notes
provides a helpful example of the relationship between negotiable
instruments and ordinary contracts that contain waiver of defense clauses.
As noted above, the U.C.C.C. (in contrast to the U.C.C.) generally prohibits
anyone from taking a negotiable instrument, other than a check, in a
consumer transaction. 151 This restriction strives to prevent merchants from
taking advantage of unsophisticated consumers who may not understand
how the holder in due course doctrine works.
*820 The drafters of the U.C.C.C., however, recognized that simply
banning merchants from taking negotiable notes from consumers would not
guarantee protection from loss of defenses. Merchants could avoid the
consequences of the ban by persuading consumers to waive their defenses
in ordinary contracts. To prevent this end-run around the prohibition, the
U.C.C.C. also bans waiver of defense clauses in certain consumer
transactions.152 If the statute did not contain this restriction, its prohibition
on taking negotiable instruments would have had little real effect.
In other situations, however, the drafters of rules designed to restrict the
holder in due course doctrine have failed to consider the alternative of
using waiver of defense clauses. For example, the drafters of the U.C.C.
believed that the assignee of a negotiable instrument should not become a
holder in due course simply because the assignee acquired the instrument
through judicial process.153 This restriction, however, has a shortcoming.
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U.C .C.C. § 3.3 07 (197 4); supra note 7 8 and acco mpa nying text.
See U.C.C.C. § 3.404 (4) (prohibiting waiver of defense clauses); supra note
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Parties can avoid the limitation in most instances by using a waiver of
defense clause that does not treat judicial sales differently from other
assignments.154 If the drafters of the U.C.C. wanted to insure that only
assignees who did not obtain instruments through judicial sales could
become holders in due course, they would have been required to ban waiver
of defense clauses that did not impose that restriction.155
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to advance a thesis that both attacks and
supports tradition. It calls into question the customary policy arguments for
the holder in due course doctrine. Yet, at the same time, it suggests another
justification for it, and consequently *821 argues that the holder in due
course doctrine has a reason for existing, and probably does not need
reform.
Policy arguments historically have done little to shape the holder in due
course doctrine. The drafters of the U.C.C. for the most part merely sought
to replicate the earlier provisions of the N.I.L.,156 while the drafters of the
predecessor N.I.L. merely sought to replicate the common law.157 The
judges who first upheld negotiability in common-law cases similarly
wanted the law to reflect merchant practices, and generally did not focus
on other policy arguments.158 The possibility that some policy arguments
made for the doctrine after its creation might have flaws, therefore, should
come as no surprise. This Article merely has attempted to devise a better
rationalization for a doctrine that has long existed, and doubtlessly will
continue to exist for some time.
*822 APPENDIX
U.C.C. § 3-302. Holder in Due Course.
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No thing in Article 3 p revents this, and A rticle 9 exp ressly allows waiver of
defense clauses without distinguishing judicial sales from other means of
acquisition. Id. § 9-2 06(1) (1995 ).
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This failure, however, prob ably makes little difference bec ause mo st
peo ple--aga in, for whatever reaso n--continue to m ake ne gotiab le instruments.
156
See Edward Rub in, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles
3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551, 552-54 (1991) (giving background of Article 3 and
4 revisions).
157
See BR ITTO N, supra note 8 , at 14-1 7 (describing form ulation o f N.I.L.).
158
See id. at 8-9 (noting that bills of exchange originated between merchant
traders).
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(a) Subject to subsection (c) and Section 3-106(d), “holder in due
course” means the holder of an instrument if:
(1) the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not
bear such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so
irregular or incomplete as to call into question its authenticity; and
(2) the holder took the instrument (i) for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii)
without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or that
there is an uncured default with respect to payment of another instrument
issued as part of the same series, (iv) without notice that the instrument
contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered, (v) without notice
of any claim to the instrument described in Section 3-306, and (vi) without
notice that any party has a defense or claim in recoupment described in
Section 3-305(a).
(b) Notice of discharge of a party, other than discharge in an insolvency
proceeding, is not notice of a defense under subsection (a), but discharge
is effective against a person who became a holder in due course with notice
of the discharge. Public filing or recording of a document does not of itself
constitute notice of a defense, claim in recoupment, or claim to the
instrument.
(c) Except to the extent a transferor or predecessor in interest has rights
as a holder in due course, a person does not acquire rights of a holder in
due course of an instrument taken (i) by legal process or by purchase in an
execution, bankruptcy, or creditor’s sale or similar proceeding, (ii) by
purchase as part of a bulk transaction not in ordinary course of business of
the transferor, or (iii) as the successor in interest to an estate or other
organization.
(d) If, under Section 3-303(a)(1), the promise of performance that is the
consideration for an instrument has been partially performed, the holder
may assert rights as a holder in due course of the instrument only to the
fraction of the amount payable under the instrument equal to the value of
the partial performance divided by the value of the promised performance.
(e) If (i) the person entitled to enforce an instrument has only a *823
security interest in the instrument and (ii) the person obliged to pay the
instrument has a defense, claim in recoupment, or claim to the instrument
that may be asserted against the person who granted the security interest,
the person entitled to enforce the instrument may assert rights as a holder
in due course only to an amount payable under the instrument which, at the
time of enforcement of the instrument, does not exceed the amount of the
unpaid obligation secured.
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(f) To be effective, notice must be received at a time and in a manner
that gives a reasonable opportunity to act on it.
(g) This section is subject to any law limiting status as a holder in due
course in particular classes of transactions.
U.C.C. § 3-305. Defenses and Claims in Recoupment.
(a) Except as stated in subsection (b), the right to enforce the obligation
of a party to pay an instrument is subject to the following:
(1) a defense of the obligor based on (i) infancy of the obligor to the
extent it is a defense to a simple contract, (ii) duress, lack of legal capacity,
or illegality of the transaction which, under other law, nullifies the
obligation of the obligor, (iii) fraud that induced the obligor to sign the
instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to learn of
its character or essential terms, or (iv) discharge of the obligor in insolvency proceedings;
(2) a defense of the obligor stated in another section of this Article or
a defense of the obligor that would be available if the person entitled to
enforce the instrument were enforcing a right to payment under a simple
contract; and
(3) a claim in recoupment of the obligor against the original payee of the
instrument if the claim arose from the transaction that gave rise to the
instrument; but the claim of the obligor may be asserted against a transferee
of the instrument only to reduce the amount owing on the instrument at the
time the action is brought.
(b) The right of a holder in due course to enforce the obligation of a
party to pay the instrument is subject to defenses of the obligor stated in
subsection (a)(1), but is not subject to defenses of the obligor stated in
subsection (a)(2) or claims in recoupment stated in subsection (a)(3) against
a person other than the holder.
*824 (c) Except as stated in subsection (d), in an action to enforce the
obligation of a party to pay the instrument, the obligor may not assert
against the person entitled to enforce the instrument a defense, claim in
recoupment, or claim to the instrument (Section 3-306) of another person,
but the other person’s claim to the instrument may be asserted by the
obligor if the other person is joined in the action and personally asserts the
claim against the person entitled to enforce the instrument. An obligor is
not obliged to pay the instrument if the person seeking enforcement of the
instrument does not have rights of a holder in due course and the obligor
proves that the instrument is a lost or stolen instrument.
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(d) In an action to enforce the obligation of an accommodation party to
pay an instrument, the accommodation party may assert against the person
entitled to enforce the instrument any defense or claim in recoupment under
subsection (a) that the accommodated party could assert against the person
entitled to enforce the instrument, except the defenses of discharge in
insolvency proceedings, infancy, and lack of legal capacity.
U.C.C. § 3-306. Claims to an Instrument.
A person taking an instrument, other than a person having rights of a
holder in due course, is subject to a claim of a property or possessory right
in the instrument or its proceeds, including a claim to rescind a negotiation
and to recover the instrument or its proceeds. A person having rights of a
holder in due course takes free of the claim to the instrument.

